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I. INTRODUCTION

The Views of Bay / Delta
Water Policy Activists on
Endangered Species Issues
by Paul A. Sabatier
and Matthew A. Zafonte

The San Francisco Bay/Delta (hereinafter "Bay/Delta").
an estuary marking the passage of the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Rivers into the Pacific Ocean, is one of the most
important bodies of water in the United States. It is the West
Coast's largest estuary, encompassing nearly 1,600 square
miles and draining over 40% of California. The Bay/Delta
constitutes the most valuable wetlands area in the Western
United States and is a critical link on the Pacific Flyway. It
supplies habitat for over 120 fish species. In 1980, the
Bay/Delta's fisheries were valued at $27 million, but this
value has declined substantially in recent years. Suisun
Marsh is also the largest contiguous brackish water marsh in
the U.S. In addition to these environmental resources, however, the Bay/Delta is also the hub of the states major water
delivery system. Water is transferred from the Sacramento
and other Northern California rivers to the South Delta,
where massive pumps from the federal Bureau of
Reclamation's (hereinafter "BOR7] Central Valley Project
(hereinafter "Cllr) and the California Department of Water
Resource's (hereinafter "DWR7] State Water Project (hereinafter "SWP") deliver it through hundreds of miles of canals.
The ultimate destination is farming areas in the San Joaquin
Valley (which supplies 45% of the nation's fresh fruits and
vegetables) and to over 15 million people in Southern
California and 1.5 million in the South Bay.'
Bay/Delta water policy has witnessed a series of major
controversies over the past thirty years. In the 1960s and
much of the 1970s, the filling of the San Francisco Bay by
land developers, ports, and airports was a major issue.
Pollution from municipal treatment plants, industries, and
surface runoff were additional concerns. In the late 1970s,
attention shifted to population declines in most Bay/Delta
fisheries due to various factors, such as water diversions (by
the CVP, SWP, and upstream users), pollution, overfishing,
and the 1987 to 1992 drought."
This Paper was prepared through the Division of Errrronmental Studies;
University of California. Davis- The authors would like to thank the
Interagency Ecological Studies Program of the Sacramento Bayifelta for providing the funds which made this research possib!e The sponsonng agencies
(the US. Bureau of Reclamation. the US. Fish and Vldlife Service. the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. the California Department of Water
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Paul A.Sabatier is a professorof environmetal studies at the University
of California. Davis. A political scientist by training (PhD.. University of
Chicago. 1974). his research has dealt primarily with policy implementation.
long-term policy change, the role of science in public policy, and bureaucratic decisionmaking involving the California coast. Lake Tahoe. and the
San Francisco Bay/ Delta.
Matthew A.Zafonte is a PhD- student in the Graduate Group in Ecolo-a
at the University of California. Davis. He received his BA from the University
of Califomia. Irvine. in 1992. with dual majors in social eco!oMf and political
science. His major research interests are chang- In elite belief systems over
time and information diffusion within policy nemorks.

I. SA

Fmcisco Emu~sr P1-,:)r.SmEcFr EsTumrf(1992).
HEM~OiL
Er n . Smus &,,D Timins REP=ra Aowsic REsouFCEen~

2. BRUce

THE SAN FrA~iosco Erasrize(1992),

Paul A.Sabafier and MahewA ZAf
onte
Since 1989, over a half-dozen species native to
the Bay/Delta' have been proposed for listing under
the federal Endangered Species Act (hereinafter
"ESA"). 3The winter-run Chinook salmon was listed as
threatened by the California Department of Fish and
Game (hereinafter "DFG"), and then by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter
"USFWS") in 1989. In 1994, its status was revised to
endangered. The Delta smelt was listed as threatened
under the ESA in March 1993. The Sacramento splittail has recently been proposed for threatened status
by the USFWS. Several other species, including the
spring-run Chinook salmon, the green sturgeon, and
4
the Red Hills roach, may qualify for listing.
While the listing of a species under the ESA is
ostensibly a purely scientific enterprise, the evidence suggests there are many other considerations involved.' This is particularly true when, as in
the case of Delta fisheries, enormous economic and
political interests are at stake. For example, the biological opinions and take limits issued to protect
the winter-run salmon and Delta smelt have been
estimated to cost over one million acre-feet of water
in critically dry years. This represents approximately 20% of the water pumped by the CVP and SWP,
with economic costs of $15.8 million. 6 Given these
stakes, one would expect to find interest groups
with widely divergent opinions: environmental and
fisheries groups favoring protection and San
Joaquin farmers and Southern California water
users opposing it.
The opinions of administrative agency officials
and university scientists are less predictable. Here,
there are at least two different schools of thought.
According to what we shall term the "civics textbook
model" (hereinafter "CTM") of public policy, agency
officials and scientists should act in a completely
neutral fashion, and it is assumed they usually do
so. In contrast, the "advocacy coalition framework"
(hereinafter "ACF") assumes that most agency officials and university scientists actively involved in
policy disputes will join with like-minded interest
group leaders and elected officials to form advocacy coalitions, i.e., actors from different institutions
who share a set of beliefs and seek to alter policy
consistent with those beliefs.
This Paper first presents the two models and
discusses their implications for the policy beliefs of
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (West 1994).
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various types of officials. We then compare the
views of different categories of interest group leaders, administrative agency officials, and university
scientists as revealed by a 1992 mail survey of
Bay/Delta water policy activists. As analyzed below,
the data provide much stronger support for the ACF
than for the CTM. The concluding section discusses
some implications of the results.

II. TWO MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICY
The two models discussed below seek to
describe the roles played by policy activists in relatively technical policy domains where scientific evidence is important. Endangered species policy and
Bay/Delta water policy would certainly meet this criterion.
A. The Civics Textbook Model
The CTM is basically a normative model, derived
from certain fundamental principles of democratic
theory. It assigns very distinct roles to three categories of actors in the policy process.' 0 While this
model is something of a straw man, it is alive and
well on the editorial pages of many newspapers. It is
also held by many agency officials and university
researchers, although we have no systematic evidence of this. rt was advocated by many civil service
reformers and progressives in the early twentieth
century and continues7 to find support among some
respected academics.
(1) Scientists are supposed to be neutral seekers of the truth. Their role is to understand the
world and to present this information to policymakers. When serving as policy advocates, they
should make their normative assumptions explicit,
(2) Elected officials are responsible for making
basic policy decisions in a manner which reflects
the distribution of values in society. They use scientific findings to help them understand trends in various problems, the factors affecting them, and the
means of alleviating those problems. Their basic
role is to establish clear laws (and budgetary priorities) for implementation by agencies.
6. 40 CFR § 131 (1994). This assumes that CVP and SWP
exporters bear all the water costs, but that water transfers are available. Without transfers, the costs increase to $28.3 million In average years and $165.3 million in critically dry years If costs are
shared by all divertors, the economic welfare losses decrease to
$0.5 million for average years and $5.5 million for dry years.
7. Paul Sabatier & Matthew Zafonte, Are Bureaucrats and Scenilsts
Members of Advocacy Coalitions? (1994) (on file with authors)
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(3) Governmental agencies are composed

largely of civil servants who should be politically
neutral and who have a special role in fostering
applied research in areas of interest to the agency.
Political appointees within the agency are responsi-

ble for seeing that the agency reflects the
Administration's priorities to the extent permitted
by law.
This normative model describes how science
should be used in making public policy. Evidence
suggests that many scientists and agency officials
involved in policy disputes do, in
fact, view them8
selves as "objective technicians".
B. Limitations of the CTM
The CTM has substantial limitations in practice,
in large part because many people do not behave as
the model indicates they should.
(1)Scientists are often not neutral participants.
Virtually all scientists operate within a specific "paradigm," which provides implicit assumptions about
basic causal relationships and proper methods of
investigation, thereby guiding research.9 As part of
these paradigms, almost all scientific disciplines
contain important normative assumptions which
many members come to accept in an uncritical fashion. For example, civil engineers generally assume
that nature exists for human purposes and that they
can mitigate virtually all negative impacts arising
from their projects. In contrast, many wildlife biologists tend to view virtually all species as having
intrinsic worth and are very skeptical of the ability of
humans to manipulate natural systems without
unforeseen adverse consequences on one or more
species. With respect to nuclear waste disposal,
Barke and Jenkins-Smith have recently provided evidence that biologists perceive significantly greater
risks than physicists, chemists, and engineers; while
the latter think basically in terms of dose-response
curves, biologists are wary of the effects of any dose
on living organisms. 0

As a further limitation to the CTM, many scientists work for governmental agencies. Of the 151
respondents to our Bay/Delta survey who had
advanced degrees and considered themselves to be
scientists, 82 (54%) worked for administrative agen8. ARNoLo MELrSNE , POUcYANAm.srs INTHE BuREAuO.ce (1976),
9. THo:wis KUHN. THE STRUCTURE
OF SoENmnnc R=LOurnonc (2d
ed. 1970); lmre Lakatos. History of Science and its Raionaql Reonstructi'n
in BOSTON STUDIES
INTHEPHILOSOP'Y OF Sa~ciEE (1971).
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cies. As such. they usually come to share the
agency's "culture." whether out of self-selection or
socialization."
Finally. scientists employed by universities are
often drawn to applied rather than basic research
because they want to help solve a particular problem. Having a demonstrable effect on policy, however, normally requires the accumulation of results
over an extended period of time. 2 The more neutral
and "apolitical" scientists are unlikely to remain
interested in an issue long enough to have such an
impact. Thus, the most active scientists in a particular dispute are likely to be those who have been
involved the longest and who are most committed
to defending a particular point of view.
The end result is that scientists who have
something to contribute to important policy disputes are seldom neutral. We are not suggesting
they manipulate or falsify data. Instead, disciplinary
paradigms, values underlying the discipline, and
the desire to solve particular problems affect various aspects of a scientist's work. including the topics chosen to research, the methods utilized, how
uncertainty is treated, where the burden of proof is
placed, and how quickly various results are presented. For example, wildlife biologists are more likely
than engineers to look for species in trouble
because their disciplinary norms define species
extinction as a serious problem. They are more likely to look to human technological interventions as a
likely explanation because they tend to respect the
beauty of natural systems, In contrast, engineers
assume they can improve on nature. Members within each discipline will readily present results which
are congruent with these assumptions, while incongruent results are likely to be interpreted as tentative and in need of further verification."'
(2) Elected officials seldom pass clear laws on
contentious issues with substantial technical components because very few have the expertise to
understand the technical issues. Instead, they tend
to pass procedural laws which hand over the problem to an administrative agency without clear policy priorities." The federal and California
Endangered Species Acts are perfect examples.
Sa==rsr mt ;x~
(1976),
12 Carol Weiss. ReFardih tr Pc.:s Sa
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(3) Agency officials are seldom as neutral as the
civil servants in the Weberian model of bureaucracy.t 6 Most agencies involved in the long-standing

controversy surrounding the protection of the
Bay/Delta-whether it be the BOR, state and federal
fish and game agencies, the Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (hereinafter "BCDC"), the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter
"EPA"), or California water agencies-have a fairly
clear overall mission which tells them to give priority to some values over others. Most officials who join
an agency come to accept those priorities, whether
out of self-selection or gradual indoctrination.
Agencies are often dominated by members of a particular profession or scientific discipline who share
the norms of colleagues outside the agency. 7 Finally,
any agency must be sensitive to the wishes of interest groups and legislators who play influential roles
in allocating budgetary and statutory resources if it is
to survive and prosper. 8 Thus, most agencies can be
expected to sponsor research consistent with their
mission and to be skeptical of findings which cast
doubt on its wisdom.
In sum, very few participants in a policy dispute
can be expected to behave in a manner consistent
with the CTM. Scientists who are actively involved
are seldom neutral. Elected officials seldom make
clear value choices. Agency officials are normally
(and properly) concerned with promoting a legal
and/or professional mission accumulated over a
number of years. Therefore, any model which
assumes neutrality on the part of most participants
is seriously flawed.
C. The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (hereinafter
"ACF") was developed by Sabatier'to understand
policy change over periods of a decade or more
within a particular substantive domain or subsystem, such as air pollution control or grade school
through high school education. 19 One of the ACFs
goals is to integrate political scientists' traditional
preoccupation with socio-economic conditions,
political ideologies, and political institutions with
policy scholars' concern with the role of policy
16. JACK
KNOTT
& GARY MILLER, REFORMING
BUREAUCRACY
(1987).

17. Robert Bell, Professional Values and Organizational Decision-

analysis and scientific information in the policy
process. To accomplish this, the ACF has to deal
explicitly with the factors affecting the behavior of
professionals and scientists working in agencies,
consulting firms, universities, and the like. It does
so by developing the concept of an advocacy coalition.
An advocacy coalition consists of interest
group leaders, legislators, agency officials,
researchers, and journalists who share a set of basic
beliefs (policy goals plus perceptions of important
causal relationships and variable states) and who
engage in some degree of coordinated activity in
order to alter the rules of governmental institutions
over time.20 In Lake Tahoe environmental policy, for
example, Sabatier and Brasher found two quite distinct coalitions in the 1970s and early 1980s: an
environmental coalition composed of environmental groups, federal and state pollution control agencies, university researchers affiliated with the Tahoe
Research Group, and several out-of-Basin California
legislators; they were opposed by an economic
development/property rights coalition composed of
local chambers of commerce, realtors and property
rights groups, most local government officials, most
public utility district officials, and most local legislators.Y' Conflict among coalitions is mediated by
"policy brokers," i.e., powerful actors more concerned with fashioning an acceptable compromise
than with achieving specific policy goals.
The belief systems of various coalitions are
organized into an hierarchical, tripartite structure
with higher and broader levels generally constraining more specific beliefs.22 At the highest, broadest
level, the "deep core" of the shared belief system
includes fundamental normative beliefs, such as
the familiar Left/Right scale, which operate across
virtually all policy domains. At the next level are
"policy core" beliefs which represent a coalition's
basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across a policy domain or subsystem. Finally,
the "secondary aspects" of a coalition's belief system within a specific policy domain comprise a
large set of narrower beliefs concerning the seriousness of the problem or the relative importance of
20. PAUL SABATIER
& HANK JENKINS-SMITH. POLICY CHANGE AND
LEARNING: AN ADVOCACY
COALmON APPROACH
25 (1993)

Making, ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY, May 1985, at 21; Marc Eisner &

21. Paul Sabatier & Anne Brasher, From Vague Consensus to
Kenneth Meier, PresidentialControl versus BureaucraticPower: Explaining
Clearly-Differentiated Coalitions: Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe,
the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, AMER. JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL.
SCIENCE, 1964-85, in POuCY CHANGE ANDLEARNING 177 (Paul Sabatler & Hank
February 1990, at 269.
Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993).
18. JERRY
PFEFFER
& GERALD SALANCIK. THE EXTERNAL
CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS (1978).

19. Paul Sabatier, An Advocacy CoalitionFrameworkof Policy Change

and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein. POLICY
Summer/Fall 1988, at 129.

SCIENCES,

22. See also Mark Pellley & Jon Hurwitz, A HierarchicalModel of
Attitude Constraint. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
November 1985. at 871.
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various causal factors in specific locales, policy
preferences regarding desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design of specific institutions, and the evaluations of various actors' performance. The ACF assumes that coalition actors use
selective perception and a variety of other devices
to screen their beliefs from challenge, particularly at
the deep core and policy core levels. Given that
beliefs are resistant to change, the composition of
coalitions is hypothesized to be stable over periods
of a decade or more.
The ACF explicitly rejects the assumption that
most bureaucrats and researchers involved in a policy area will be neutral. Some may well have no
strong policy preferences, at least initially. But the
ACF contends that, as conflict between coalitions
increases and as the interrelationships among sets
of beliefs become clearer over time, initially loose
groups with amorphous beliefs will coalesce into
increasingly distinct coalitions with coherent belief
systems. In this process, most neutral actors, particularly university scientists, will drop out.2 3 The ACF
thus contends that, in well-developed subsystems,
most active agency officials and researchers will be
members of specific coalitions sharing a set of policy core beliefs and acting in concert to some degree.
The ACF does not, however, assume that university scientists and agency officials will be indistinguishable from interest group leaders, particularly in
their behavior. Instead, agency officials will usually
be more moderate in their beliefs, particularly in
their public expression, because they must be cautious about offending the multiple principals upon
whom they depend for legal and budgetary
resources. 4 Similarly, university researchers should
be more willing than their professional colleagues in
agencies and interest groups to alter important perceptions in the policy core and secondary aspects
because they are not constrained by the official
position of their organization on such topics.
D. Contrasting Hypotheses from the Two Models
The ACF clearly expects agency officials and university researchers to have belief systems involving
basic values, perceptions, and policy preferences
23. For evidence concerning land use policy at Lake Tahoe, sa
Paul Sabatier & Susan McLaughlin. Belief Congruence Bctuw n Interet
Group Leaders and Merbers. J oUNAL
F PoLmcs, August 1990. at 914,
Sabatier and Brasher. supra note 2 1.
24. Hank lenkins-Smith & Gilbert St Clair. Te PolitiscfONcre
Energy: Testing le Advocacy Coalition Fnamzewor, in Pouce CNHARE AND
LEARNING149 (Paul Sabatier & Hank Jenkins-Smith eds., 1993).
25. The number of respondents and the response rate for various categories of actors:
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which are very similar to their interest group allies,
although perhaps in more moderate positions.
In contrast, the CTM would first expect agency
officials and university researchers to be grouped
around the population mean on all scales involving
normative items or policy preferences. The CTM
contends that civil servants and university
researchers either have no coherent policy belief
systems, in which case their responses will regress
to the population mean. or. in the case of civil servants, they select -middle-of-the-road" belief systems which are least likely to raise the ire of their
politically-appointed superiors from different political parties. Second, the neutral expertise argument
would expect civil servants and university
researchers to have much less coherent policy belief
systems than interest group leaders and legislators.

Ill. DATA BASE
The data base for this Paper comes from
responses to a 14-page questionnaire mailed in the
winter of 1992-93 to our estimate of the set of policy activists who in 1992 were informed and actively
seeking to influence some aspect of Bay/Delta water
policy (e.g., fill, water quality, and/or flows). The
names were obtained from three sources: (I) people
active in the San Francisco Estuary Project or in
State Water Resources Control Board (hereinafter
"SWRCB") hearings on the Bay/Delta (hereinafter
"Bay/Delta Hearings"). (2) the major officials in critical agencies and interest groups concerned with
some aspect of Bay/Delta water policy, and (3) people nominated as influential by the advisory committee to our project. This produced a census of 779
names, of whom 427 responded, for an overall
response rate of 55%.25 In addition, 20 people were
added from a companion 1984-92 panel survey
when they said they were as active in 1992 as they
had been in 1984 (even though they had not made
our original list of 1992 policy elites).25 Finally. since
we are primarily interested in comparing the
responses of policy activists from different institutions, 18 people are counted twice because they
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93
32
22
47
62
6
I
427

60%
52%
56%
65%
44%
53%

55%
33%
55%

26 These included 6 emirnonmental group leaders. 5 POIV!
officials, 2 local govemment offica3?s, and 2 consultants.
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hold two positions: one on the board of a regional
agency, the other as a state or local government official." Thus, our data set consists of 465 respondents.
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(4) DFG (n=l 1). These were officials, primarily
civil servants, from the DFG. While their views generally paralleled those of their biologist colleagues
in the two federal wildlife agencies, state agency
personnel differed on some issues (e.g., the
Peripheral Canal) and thus were kept separate.

IV. RESULTS
In order to test the competing hypotheses, we
first grouped our 465 respondents into a reasonable
number of organizational affiliations. The bulk of
the analysis consists of arraying officials from different organizations on a variety of attitudinal
scales dealing with endangered species policy to
see if agency officials and university researchers
cluster around the population mean, as predicted
by the CTM, or, instead, are allied with interest
groups in discernible coalitions, as predicted by the
ACE Next will come several regression analyses to
see if civil servants have belief systems which are as
coherent or constrained as other actors.
A. Categories of Organizational Affiliation
Our 465 respondents came from over one hundred organizations which play a recurring role in
Bay/Delta water policy. To reduce these to a reasonable number, we grouped them into the following
twenty categories of organizational affiliation.
Different organizations were collapsed into the
same affiliation category (a) if they had similar functions and/or locale (e.g., Bay local governments)
and (b) if their respondents expressed similar views
on our attitudinal scales.
(1) BOR/DWR (n=20). These were officials, primarily civil servants, from the BOR and the DWR,
the agencies that operate the CVP and SWP, sending
water from the Delta to the San Joaquin Valley,
Southern California, and the South Bay (San lose).
(2) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (n=8). These
were civil servants from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (hereinafter "Corps"), the federal agency
primarily responsible for regulating dredging and
construction in wetlands.

(5) EPA/Misc. Resource Agencies (n=30). About
a third of this group (sometimes referred to as the
"EPA group") came from the EPA, with the rest coming from a variety of federal and state natural
resources agencies, including the State Lands
Commission, the California EPA, and the U.S. Soil
Conservation Service; almost all were civil servants,
(6) SWRCB (n=l 1). These were officials, primarily civil servants, 28 from the SWRCB, the state
agency primarily responsible for both water quality
and water rights/flows. Under the SWRCB were several regional boards, including two in our survey
Respondents from the three organizations
expressed different enough views that we decided
not to aggregate them.
(7) San Francisco RWOCB (n=13). These were
board members and senior staff (most of the latter
being civil servants) from the San Francisco
Regional Water Quality Control Board (hereinafter
"SFRWQCB"), the regional board with jurisdiction
over San Francisco Bay and a portion of the Delta.
(8) Central Valley RWQCB (n=10). Similarly,
these were board members and senior staff from the
Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control
Board (hereinafter "CVRWQCB"), the regional board
with jurisdiction over the Sacramento Valley, the
San loaquin Valley, and the remainder of the Delta.
(9) BCDC/Misc. Regional Agencies (n=29).
These were primarily board members and staff from
the BCDC, which regulated building and fill along
the Bay shoreline. This group (sometimes referred
to as the "BCDC group") contained a few people
from other Bay Area regional parks and planning
agencies.

(3) USFWS/NMFS (n=13). These were officials,
primarily civil servants, from the USFWS and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (hereinafter
"NMFS"), the two federal agencies responsible for
fisheries and endangered species.

(10) Bay/Delta Local Government (n=43).
These were elected officials and senior staff from
general purpose local governments and water supply agencies in the Bay/Delta.

27. Of the 18, 14 are members of the BCDC who are also local
or state government officials; 3 are members of the board of the
CVRWQCB (as well as leaders of water districts or major agricultural organizations); and one is with the Aquatic Habitat Institute (as

well as the SFRWOCB)
28. In fact, only one of the five board members responded, to
the data presented here should be interpreted as the views of the
senior staff concerned with the Bay/Delta
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(11) Southern California (n=22). These were
elected officials and senior staff from water agencies in Southern California who either testified at
Bay/Delta Hearings or were on the boards of the
SWP or CVP Contractors Associations.
(12) San Joaquin Valley/Statewide Agriculture
(n=25). These were primarily elected officials or
senior staff from water or irrigation districts in the
San Joaquin Valley who testified at Bay/Delta
Hearings or were on the CVP/SWP boards. It also
included seven representatives of statewide agricultural organizations-such as the Farm Bureau,
Grange, and Agricultural Chemicals Associationwho testified at the Bay/Delta Hearings and whose
responses were very similar to those from the San
Joaquin Valley.
(13) Sacramento Valley (n= 10). These were officials from general purpose local governments
slightly upstream of the Delta or from water districts
in the Sacramento Valley (i.e., north of the Delta)
who testified at the Bay/Delta Hearings or were
active in the Estuary Project.
(14) University/Misc. Researchers (n=32).
These were primarily university faculty who had
been active in Bay/Delta research; it also included a
few researchers from institutes in the Bay Area.
such as the Tiburon Center., Most of these names
were taken from the lists of technical advisors to the
Estuary Project.
(15) Consultants (n=23). These were researchers
in consulting firms who had been active on Bay/Delta
water issues, either as advisors to the Estuary Project
or as participants before Bay/Delta Hearings.
(16) Private Dischargers (n=28). These were primarily water quality specialists with industries that
discharged wastes either directly or indirectly (via
sewer systems) into the Bay/Delta.
(17) Public Dischargers (n=27). These included board members and senior staff from the five
publicly-owned sewage treatment works (here29. RAW. RHODES. BEYOND WESTMINSTER AND VHIrEHALL (1988);
P.
BERAuRD MARIN & RENATE
Wwnz, Poucy NEwoas (1991); JOHN
HEINZ ErAL. THE HOLLOW CORE (1993).
30. Wre used a two-tailed t-test to determine if the mean for a
specific organizational category was significantly different from the
overall population mean. Ifthe variance for the organizational category differed significantly (p<05) from the population mean, we
used an unequal variance test; if it didn't, we used an equal variance test.
31. We compared the views of civil servants versus elected
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inafter "POTNVs "] in the Bay Area or the association
of such dischargers.
(18) Business/Ports (n=27). This included 14
representatives from business associations (primarily the Bay Planning Coalition) and 13 from ports and
airports in the Bay Area. These groups tended to
have similar views, in part because of their common
interest in development along the Bay shoreline.
(19) Environmental/Sportsmens Groups (n=54).
These were the senior staff and critical board members from the principal environmental and fishingfhunting groups concerned with the Bay/Delta.
(20) Other (n=28). This was a miscellaneous
group composed of journalists, leaders of educational fora, union leaders, a few state legislators.
and anonymous respondents. This category was not
mentioned in most of our analyses, although its
members were included in the overall means.
This diverse set of officials from agencies and
legislators at multiple levels of government, interest groups, and researchers is typical of many policy subsystems?
B. Positions of Agencies, Researchers, and
Interest Groups on Endangered Species Issues
This section provides the mean scores for each
organizational category on a variety of endangered
species issues. Each figure also provides the overall population mean, standard error bars for each
organizational category, and an indication of
whether the means for specific organizational categories are significantly different from the overall
mean." The data are for all members of an organizational category, since this is what the ACF and
most observers are interested in. We realize, however, that the CTM applies primarily to civil servants. In most cases, there is no statistically significant difference between civil servants and elected
or appointed officials within an organizational category;3 in cases where there is---chiefly involving
the SFR\VQCB and CVRWVCB-these are noted in
the figures. The various attitudes relevant to
officials and political appointees for six categories of agencies
(BORDwP,. the EPA group, the BCDC group, Bay local go;emmerts. Southern California water districts, and San Ioaquin Valley
water districts) on 13 attitudinal and perceptual items, There were
statistically significant differences on six of those 78 relationships.
or slightly greater than would be expected by chance at the,05 IT;el
and slightly less than chance at the. 10 leveL On the CVRWOCB and
SFRWOCB. ho,:xeer there were significant differences (p-05) on II
of the 26 items; in all cases. the boards were more conservative and
less environmental than the staff
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endangered species policy are arranged according
to ACF categories: (1) is a purely normative scale in
the deep core, (2) provides scales combining normative and perceptual items in the policy core, (3)
indicates purely perceptual items, and, finally, (4) is
two policy preferences.
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tion, which shall be tested later in the Paper, is that
officials' general views toward humans' role in
nature will affect their attitudes toward specific
endangered species issues.
Note that the overall mean is 2.77, indicating
that most of the respondents to our survey disagreed with utilitarian views." Within this context,
however, most members of the organizational cateScale.
Nature
of
View
I. Utilitarian
at the top right of the figure 4 held relatively
gories
seven-item
a
for
data
the
presents
Figure 1
utilitarian views which were significantly different
scale representing a Utilitarian View of Nature. High
from the overall mean. It is interesting to note
scores on this scale reflect strong agreement with
that, for the SFRWQCB, civil servants
("CS") had relatively anti-utilitarian
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
views while the political appointees
San Joaquin valley
ME
("PA"), i.e., board members, held relME.#.
Southern California
.
llN
atively utilitarian views which were
Business / Ports
very similar to those of San Joaquin
ON*
US BoR /CA DWR
lII
Central Valley RWQCB
farmers and Southern California
no*
Private Dischargers
water districts. This is hardly surprisE
Public Dischargers
Ing, given that most of the staff in
l
l
SacramentoValley
the winter of 1992-93 were water
Bay Local Govt
quality specialists, while the board
II
Overall Mean
was appointed by a Republican
Consultants
Governor from Southern California
PAI*
l
l
cSl*
San Francisco RWOCB,
who
had strong political ties to San
SWRCB
ll
farmers. Finally, at the botJoaquin
US Army Corps
1
I
r *
tom left of the figure are the groups
I
1
CAFish &Game
no**
reflecting strongly anti-utilitarian
University/Misc. Researchers
l1**
views. These included officials from
BCDC / Mlsc- Regional Agencies
*
o*
EPA/Misc. Resource Agencies
environmental and/or sportsmens
l
l*
USFWS/NMFS
groups, the federal and state fish*3*
Environmental/Sporting Groups
eries agencies, the EPA and other
Low= I
High =7
resource agencies, the BCDC and
other Bay regional agencies, and uniFigure 1
versity researchers.
Mean scores of affiliation categories on
These data are more supportive
Utilitarian View of Nature Scale
of the ACF than of the CTM. First,
with standard error bars and probabilities
of ing different than the overall mean.
university scientists held views
*. **. :4* = significant at the 05, 01.and 001levels rmpecisely
All to-talled
which were much more environmentally protective (anti-utilitarian) than
the overall mean. Second, of the nine categories of
statements such as "one person's right to a clean
administrative agency officials, five comprised peoenvironment is not as important as another's right
to gainful employment," "plants and animals exist
ple whose views, on average, differed significantly
from the overall mean and a sixth, the SFRWQCB,
primarily for man's use," and "mankind was created
had staff and political appointees whose views each
to rule over the rest of nature."32 Low scores reflect
36
differed from the overall mean.
strong disagreement with such views. The assump32. The ACF would characterize this as a 'deep core' scale
because it applies to all of environmental policy, while the subsystem of interest is restricted to Bay/Delta water policy.
33. An overall mean of 4.00 would indicate ambivalence on a
seven-point scale, while a mean of 1.00 would be extremely
opposed, and a mean of 7.00 would be extremely supportive.
34. In other words. San loaquin farmers, Southern California
water districts. Bay businesses and ports, agency officials from the
BOR and DWR, and private dischargers from the Bay Area.

35. Three asterisks ("*) indicate there is only one chance In
a thousand that San Joaquin farmers did not differ from the overall mean. One asterisk (M means there is a 5% probability that
BOR/DWR officials did not differ from the overall mean.
36. The use of the mean for a given organizational category
will underestimate the extent to which individuals within that category differ from the population mean. For example, the mean for officials from Bay local governments is very similar to the overall mean,
of the 43 local government officials However, 14 held views higher
than 3.3 (where means of categories started being significantly dif-
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consisting of three items regarding Bay/Delta fisheries. These issues were the perceived impact of
upstream'dams and diversions on Delta fisheries, a
preference that instream flow requirements be sufficient to restore fish populations to pre-1976 levels, and a perception that the weight of political
power in the southern half of the state would not be
kind to Bay water quality. (For details of scale construction, see Appendix.)
The means on this scale vary more than on the
previous ones, ranging all the way from a low of 1.9
for San Joaquin Valley farmers to a high of 6.4 for
environmental/sportsmens groups, suggesting
potential for much greater conflict. But the coalitions

Only Bay local government officials had, on
average, views closely approximating the overall
mean. On the other hand, officials from the SWRCB
and the Corps tended to hold relatively anti-utilitarian views; however, their views were not great
enough to differ significantly from the overall mean
(at the .10 level).
2. Two Bay/Delta Scales.
We now examine tvo attitudinal scales composed of items dealing with the Bay/Delta. The first
consists of seven statements dealing with various
aspects of environmental policy in the Bay/Delta,
such as "we cannot afford to let policies claiming to
promote environmental quality prevent the continued economic development of the Bay Area" and "protecEYrOr1/
tion of Bay water quality requires that

2

regulations be rigorously enforced,

EPA IK mrum U Aercdes
Fc

even when they create hardships for
dischargers." The scale is constructed
in such a way that a high score indi-
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cates perceptions that environmental
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problems are serious, that environmental quality should be a priority
value, and that state and federal
intervention is necessary to solve
those problems.3 7 (For details of scale

construction, see Appendix.)
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The data for Figure 2 are quite
U
similar to those in the previous secr
tion. The means for most categories
=a
sen tern o&rd
were greater than 4.0. suggesting that
virtually no group of activists felt
Launens/It
Sa
environmental quality in the Bay Area
High = 7
was a minor problem which could
safely be left to local officials. Within
Figure 2
this loose conisensus, activists in federal and state fisheries agencies,
Bay-Delta Environmental Concern Scale
environmental groups, the EPA
group, the BCDC group, university
~~~~
Al * -,-Ii~icc
researchers, and, in this case, SWRCB
staff, were on the very high end of the
are, for the most part, quite familiar. At the low end.
scale (means greater than 5.7). while those for San
with means significantly different from the overall
Joaquin farmers, Southern California water districts.
mean, were San Joaquin farmers, Southern California
Bay businesses/ports, and both public and private
water districts, the BOR/DWR, and political
dischargers in the Bay tended to be relatively neuappointees (but not civil servants) to the CVRWCQCB.
tral, with their means significantly lower than the
At the high end were environmental groups, the fedoverall mean.
eral and state fisheries agencies, the BCDC group.
The next scale (Figure 3) is narrower in scope,
ferent from the overall mean) and 17 had scores less than 2.2 (the
level at which categorical means were different from the overall

mean). within the BOR/DWR category, there was less variance, with
only four of 20 respondents below 2.2 (or even 3.0).

37 Althouph these do not necesanrly go together the fact that
they scaled together indicates that. for this set of respondents, the
perceived serousness of Bay environmental problems and the need
for extra.ocal inter'ention were. in fact. highly inter-correlated.
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3. Perceptions Relating to
Endangered Species.
We now turn to three items
relating to endangered species, The
first, shown in Figure 4, concerns
interpretations of a graph of the fall
abundance of Delta smelt populations in the period from 1967 to
1990.

1800
1600,

1400
1200

-

I-

-

2000
.S

.

800

1975

1

-

t948

1983..........

600,-A,'

to those of environmental/fisheries
groups, rather than being neutral.
Second, the means of most agency
categories have been significantly
different from the overall mean.
Officials from the BOR/DWR and
Southern California water districts
have been consistently on the utilitarian (anti-environmental) end of
the spectrum, while officials from
federal and state fisheries agencies,
EPA and other state/federal resource
agencies, and BCDC and other Bay
regional planning agencies have
tended to be at the anti-utilitarian
(pro-environmental) end, On the
other hand, officials from Bay local
governments, the Corps, and SWRCB
staff have generally been relatively
close to the overall mean, Finally,
while civil servants on the CVRWOCB
have been relatively close to the
overall mean, their counterparts on
the SFRWQCB have generally been
part of what might be termed "the
environmental coalition."

Interestingly, two professional
wildlife
biologists, Randy Brown of
"N /
200
DWR and Peter Moyle of the
0
.
--University of California, Davis, have
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 2979 1981 2983 2985 1987
1989
proposed quite different interpretaFigure 4
tions of this graph. Brown saw it as
Delta Smelt Fail Abundance Indices
evidence that smelt populations
for the MIdater Trawl Survey
for Years 1967-73, 1975-78, 1980-89
were small but stable, while Moyle
interpreted it as suggesting the smelt
the EPA group, university researchers, civil servants
should be listed as a threatened species." The
(but not political appointees) to the SFRWOCB, and,
graph and a set of five interpretations were includto a slightly lesser extent, private dischargers.
ed in our survey of Bay water policy activists.
Thus far we have discussed three attitudinal
The results, shown in Figure 5, indicate that proscales comprising a mixture of problem perceptions
fessional standards of data interpretation appear to
and policy preferences dealing with environmental
have been at work. With the exception of environquality. The results are much more consistent with
mental groups, the means for all organizational catthe ACF than with the CTM. First, university scienegories were between 2.6 and 3.7, suggesting that
tists have demonstrated points of view quite similar
relatively few agency (or even interest group) offi=:

400

-

.

38. Randall Brown, Impacts of State Water Project Operations on Fish

and Wildlife Resources of the Bay/Delta, Seminar, U.C. Davis (May 8, 1991).
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cials interpreted the graph as strong
evidence for either position. However.
Environmental /Sporting Groups
mm1
within that general consensus we find
mm
EPA I mia Resource Agendes
our familiar coalitions. On the
University I Misc. Researchers
"threatened' end of the scale, with
USFWSINMFS
means significantly different from the
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overall mean, were environmental
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groups, the EPA group, and university
I
Overall Mean
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US Army Corps
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The second perception states
Figure 5
that "the number of potentially
Mean Evaluations of Graph
endangered species which live in or
of Delta Smelt Populations
migrate through the Delta indicates
by affiliation category
with standard error bars and probcblies
that its biological resources are
of being different than the cre.mil mean.
under severe stress.- The mean
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responses for various categories are
found in Figure 6.
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federal fisheries agencies, the BCDC
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DFG officials were on the environmental end of the spectrum, but
wide internal variance kept their
mean from being significantly different from the overall mean."
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Figure 7
Perception that Delta Smelt Listing
will have Serious Economic Repercussions
by affiliation category
with standard error bars and probabilities
of being different than the overall mean.
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Attitudes Re: Amending the ESA to Include
Economic Feasibility In the Listing Process
by affiliation category
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39. Neither Perry Herrgesell from DFG nor Randy Brown from
DWR could provide an obvious explanation for these somewhat
anomalous findings. With respect to the costs of listing the smelt,
part of the variance may come from differences between upper

4. Policy Preferences on Endangered Species Listings.
Finally, we look at responses to
two items dealing with the listing
process. The first concerns the criteria for listing, specifically, "the
Endangered Species Act should be
amended to include economic feasibility in the listing of species."
Responses by organizational category are found in Figure 8.
There is an extremely wide dispersion, with means ranging from a
high of 6.7 for Southern California
water districts to a low of 1.3 for
DFG. The results also indicate the
normal coalitions. At the high
(strongly agreeing) end are officials
from Southern California water districts, San Joaquin Valley farm organizations and water districts, the
BOR/DWR, board members (but not
staff) from the SFRWOCB, and three
user groups from the Bay Area
(waterfront businesses and ports,
public dischargers, and private dischargers). At the low end are the
state and federal fisheries agencies,
environmental/sportsmens groups,
the EPA group, and the BCDC
group.
The second item concerns
whether "the Delta smelt should be
listed as an endangered species

management (who are concerned with political and economic feasibility) and field-level staff, who may perceive farmers and urban
districts to be wealthy enough to bear extra costs without severe
repercussions.
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under federal or state law."10 The means for various
organizational categories are found in Figure 9.
The results are virtually the mirror image of
those regarding the use of economic criteria in the
listing process. First, the means extend over almost
the entire range of the 1-7 Likert scale. Second,
there are the usual coalitions, with San Joaquin
farmers. Southern California water districts,
BOR/DWR, Bay businesses/ports, and Bay public
(but not private) dischargers opposed to listing the
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Figure 9
Attitudes Regarding Usting
the Delta Smelt as Endangered
by affiliation cateCory
idthstandard error bars and probzbllide

of being different than the cerall mean.
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Delta smelt. At the environmental (pro-listing) end
were the federal and state fisheries agencies, environmental/sportsmens groups, the EPA group, the
BCDC group, and university researchers.
Interestingly, most members of the SFRWIQCB
opposed listing the smelt, while most staff supported it.
Looking back over the views of policy activists
on a variety of attitudinal scales related to environmental policy and endangered species, the results
provide much more support for the ACF than forthe
CTM. First, university scientists involved in
40. The survey occurred in the winter of 1992-93. after the
smelt had been proposed for listing under the ESA but before the
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Bay/Delta water policy are clearly not neutral. On
each of the nine itemsscales, their mean was quite
similar to that of environmental groups and significantly different from the overall mean. Second,
agency officials (primarily civil servants) from most
agencies were also not neutral, but, instead, tended
to express views quite similar to interest groups.
Officials from the BOR/DWR. Southern California
water districts, and, on several items, Bay Area public dischargers tended to have views very similar to
those of San Joaquin farmers and
Bay waterfront businesses and
ports. Likewise, officials from the
7
6
Enttwo federal fisheries agencies, EPA
m4 I
and state/federal resource agenil
j
cies, BCDC and Bay regional agencies, and, on most issues, DFG
R4.
tended to express views quite sim56
ilar to those of environmental
I
groups. On the other hand, the
mean values of officials from the
Corps. Bay local governments, and,
cal.
on most issues, the staff from the
i
RCB and the two regional water
boards tended to be close to the
overall mean. This occurred even
though individuals within those
organizations certainly held views
I
similar to those of the two coalitions.

San Joaquln Valle)

Strongly Opposed =I

lrC

rvety

C. Do Civil Servants Have
Coherent Belief Systems?
The ACF would argue that,
since most agency officials are
members of coalitions, they should
have policy belief systems which
are roughly as coherently organized as those of interest group

activists. A coherent belief system
is one which integrates a wide
range of propositions from the very general to the
quite specific. In contrast, the CTM would argue
that, since civil servants essentially do not care
about public policy but simply follow the wishes of
their hierarchical superiors, their policy-oriented
beliefs should be much tess coherent than those of
interest group activists. These contrasting hypotheses are tested in Table 1.which provides the results
from multiple regression analyses. The table indicates the relative importance of a variety of items
(from the deep core Utilitarianism Scale to several
specific causal perceptions) in explaining support
formal listing In March of 19B.
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Table 1.
Comparing Multiple Regression Results for all Respondents
and for Civil Servants on Two Endangered Species Policy Positions
Support Amending the ESA to
Include Economic Feasibility
in the Listing of Species
Oniy
Civil
Servants Total
(n=122) (n=357)

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Deep Core
Utilitarian View of Nature Scale
Policy Core
Bay/Delta Environmental Concern Scale
Delta Flows/Fisheries Scale
Perceptions
Graph Shows Delta Smelt Threatened
Listing Smelt Will Have Serious
Economic Repercussion
Number of Potentially Endangered
Species Using Delta Indicate
Resources Under Severe Stress

.30""

.34"..

Support Listing of
Delta Smelt as
Endangerred Species
Only
Civi
Servants Total
(n=105) (n=321)
-. 12

-. 22'"

.31"'
-. 09

-. 24.'
-. 11-

.25"
.32.'

.18.'
.23"'"

-. 04

-. 02

.12*

.11**

.17'

.24"

-.17"

-. 25""

-. 05

-. 02

.17*

.05

Adjusted R2

.58

.71

.76

.75

F

29

144

55

161

" coefficients significant at the .05. .01. .001 levels, respectively.
The coefficients are standardized regression coefficients.

for two endangered species policy proposals: (1)
adding economics to the criteria for listing, and (2)
supporting the listing of the Delta smelt.
The results in Table 1 generally support the
ACE In both policy proposals, the variance4'
explained by the six explanatory variables was
roughly the same for civil servants as for the total
population (civil servants, interest group officials,
researchers, and legislators). This suggests that, at
least on these two items, the belief systems of civil
servants were as coherently integrated as those of
other policy activists. In addition, on both items,
the signs and significance levels of the standardized
regression coefficients were quite comparable
between civil servants and the population as a
whole. This indicates that the structures of their
respective belief systems regarding endangered
species were quite similar.
V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The results presented in this Paper concerning
the views of Bay/Delta water policy activists in the
4 1. Indicated by the Adjusted R2; it can range from 0 to a maximum of 1.0.
42. These included DWR/BOR. Southern California water dis-

winter of 1992-93 with respect to endangered
species issues clearly provide more support for the
ACF than for the CTM. Specifically, most university
faculty consistently expressed views similar to
those of environmental group leaders rather than
being neutral.
Further, most officials from many administrative agencies" held views very similar to their interest group allies rather than being neutral, as represented by the population mean. On the other hand,
the mean views of officials from several agencies,
including Bay local governments, the Corps, and, to
a lesser extent, civil servants from the SWRCB, the
CVRWQCB, and the SFRWQCB, were close to the
overall population mean.
A third indication in support of the ACF is that
the belief systems of civil servants were similar In
coherence and structure to those of other policy
activists.
Finally, on endangered species issues, Bay
water policy elites in 1992-93 appear to be organized into two coalitions. The first was a utilitarian
coalition composed of most officials from San
Joaquin Valley farmers and water districts, Southern
tricts, the two federal fisheries agencies, DFG, EPA and other
state/federal resources agencies, BCDC and other Bay regional
agencies, and. to a lesser extent, public dischargers In the Bay Area.
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California water districts, the BOR/DWR, Bay waterfront developers/ports, and, to a lesser degree, Bay
public and private dischargers and board members
from the two regional water quality boards. They
were opposed by an environmental coalition composed of most officials from environmental/sportsmens groups, the two federal fisheries agencies
(USFWS and NMFS), university researchers, the EPA
and other federal/state resources agencies, the
BCDC and other Bay Area regional agencies, and, to
a somewhat lesser extent, DFG.
With respect to policy implications, we start
from the normative premise that the major coalitions in a policy domain (such as endangered
species policy affecting the Bay/Delta) should be
represented in all major implementation decisions
within that domain. If one accepts this premise, the
following conclusions seem to follow:
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It also strikes us that proposals to amend the
listings process to take it out of the sole jurisdiction
of the USEWS and NMFS may have merit, given the
strong environmental predilections of officials from
those agencies. However, turning decisionmaking
over to a committee of university scientists (e.g., via
a National Academy of Sciences Committee) might
not solve the problem. Some method needs to be
developed to include professional scientists from
the utilitarian coalition. At the same time, however,
our major premise compels us to recommend that
implementation activities fostering development
potentially affecting biodiversity, such as state-level
economic development and infrastructure initiatives,
include members from the environmental coalition.

1. in forming technical advisory committees,
assume that most university scientists concerned with the Bay/Delta have fairly pro-environmental belief systems. Therefore, make sure
that the committee has an adequate number of
scientists from institutions forming the utilitarian coalition.
2. Recognize that most officials from the
USFWS, the NMFS. the EPA, and, to a lesser
extent, DFG have relatively strong environmental beliefs, while most officials from the BOR
and DWR have equally strong utilitarian beliefs.
This may have implications for the desirability
of leaving officials from either coalition solely
in charge of major implementation decisions,
such as the listing of a species, the development of recovery plans or biological opinions,
the development of take limits, or the operation of the SWP and CVP (at least during the
February-June period critical for winter-run
salmon and Delta smelt).
With respect to the latter, the December 1994
compromise agreement on Bay/Delta water quality
standards seems to have "foreshadowed" these concers, at least with respect to take limits and the
operation of the projects. It proposed that take limits and other operational decisions be decided by an
expanded Operations Committee composed of the
CVP and SWP operators and representatives from the
federal and state fishenes agencies, urban and agricultural water users, and environmental groups 3
43. This is based upon a reading of the Ioint PropmaforRschMn
San FranascoBay-Deha Issues (prepared by CUWA-AG In November of
1994). as amended by the Pnnupks for A reni on Say-Dlia
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(signed on December 15. I94).
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APPENDIX: SCALE CONSTRUCTION

regulations be rigorously enforced, even when
they create hardships for dischargers (r=.65).

The attitudinal scales utilized in this Paper
have been constructed in two separate operations,
one for deep core items, the other for those in the
policy core.

3.The diking and filling of wetlands in the
decades prior to 1970 resulted in a serious loss
of wildlife habitat in the Bay (r=.64).

The first factor analysis deals with 22 general
items aimed at identifying fundamental normative
orientations whose scope is broader than Bay/Delta
water policy. These "deep core" -items are derived
largely from other studies and measured on 7-point
Likert scales. A principle component factor analysis
with varimax rotation identified three scales, one of
which is utilized in this Paper. The Utilitarian View
of Nature Scale involves the following seven items:
I .One person's right to a clean environment is
not as important to another's right to gainful
employment (r=.74).

4.Bay fishery populations (e.g. crab, shellfish,
striped bass, smelt) are generally in good
health (r=-.58).
5.The San Francisco Bay/Delta is a resource of
importance to people beyond the local level,
and thus should be subject to state and federal
policies (r=.61).
6.Clear state and federal environmental standards are necessary because local officials in
the Bay Area cannot be expected to make the
difficult choices which risk harming their constituents (r=.59).

4.Environmental regulations should not be
promulgated unless the proponents can prove
that the monetary benefits will exceed the costs
(r=.66).

7.Local, state, and federal agencies have been
successful in protecting the public trust
resources (navigation, recreation, open space,
wildlife, and aquatic habitat) of the Delta
(r=-.54).
A reliability analysis produced a Cronbach's
alpha of .85.
The second policy core scale is a somewhat
narrower one concerned with Bay Flows/Fisheries:

5.We should focus primarily on protecting
those species which are most interesting or
important to us rather than on those which are
most endangered (r=.63).

1.Upstream dams and diversions have sufficiently reduced inflows to the Delta so as to
pose serious problems to Bay/Delta fisheries
(r=.67).

6.All species have an inherent right to exist,
quite apart from any instrumental use .to
mankind (r=-.62).

2.Because political power in the state lies primarily in Southern California and the San
Joaquin Valley, water policy decisions by the
Governor and Legislature are more likely to
reflect those needs than concern with Bay water
quality (r=.66).
3.In-stream flow requirements from the
Sacramento River to the Bay/Delta should be
sufficient to restore fish populations to pre1976 levels (r=.52).

2.Plants and animals exist primarily for man's
use (r=.72).
3.Mankind was created to rule over the rest of
nature (r=.68).

7.Practical considerations should come first,
beauty second (r=.57).
A reliability analysis on the above items produced an alpha of .88.
A second factor analysis dealt with a series of
Likert-scale normative and perceptual items dealing either with Bay/Delta water issues as a whole or
with critical aspects (e.g., fisheries) linked to many
other aspects. A principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation identified three scales, two
of which are used in this paper. The first of these
"policy core" scales is a Bay/Delta Environmental
Concern Scale:
I.We cannot afford to let policies claiming to
promote "environmental quality" prevent the
continued economic development of the Bay
Area (r=-.67);
2.Protection of Bay water quality requires that

A reliability analysis produced a Cronbach's
alpha of .78.
In constructing the above attitudinal scales, we
added the scores on their items linearly and divided
by the total number of items on the scale. In dealing
with missing data, we retained all respondents who
had answered at least one item, but changed the
divisor to the number of items answered. If the
respondent did not answer any of the items on a
scale, her/his score on that scale was considered
"missing" and not used in any of the analyses.

